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Resilient design for community safety and terror-resistant cities
J. Coaffee PhD, C. Moore PhD, D. Fletcher PhD and L. Bosher PhD, FRGS, MICDDS
Resilience against an array of traditional and
unconventional terrorist threats is increasingly
important to the way towns and\ cities are designed and
managed and how built environment professionals
attempt to enhance levels of community safety. This is
particularly the case with regard to crowded public
places and transport systems such as light rail or trams,
which are seen as particularly vulnerable to terrorist
attack. This paper argues that contemporary terrorist
threats and tactics mean that counter-terrorism in
urban areas should increasingly seek to hybridise hard
and soft engineering solutions in order to design and
manage the built environment in ways that can reduce the
occurrence or impact of a terrorist attack. In particular, it
is argued that for counter-terrorism to be successful,
inter-professional solutions are required for a wide range
of public, private and community stakeholders that are
(or should be) involved with the planning, design,
construction, operation and management of public places.
1. INTRODUCTION
Successful places are safe, well maintained and well managed.
Achieving this depends on managing the physical asset effectively
and appropriately. With the right structures, people who live and use
the place will be able to influence what happens there.1
Community safety is a broad issue that has become central to
recent UK Government attempts to create sustainable
communities and secure public places. For example, Safer Places:
The Planning System and Crime Prevention argued that ‘safety
and security are essential to successful, sustainable
communities’.2 Not only are such places well-designed, attractive
environments in which to live and work, they are also places
where freedom from crime—and from the fear of crime—improves
the quality of life. This guide identified seven ‘attributes of
sustainability’ that should be considered as ‘prompts’ to thinking
about promoting community safety.2 These attributes,
summarised in Table 1, draw significantly on the ideas of ‘crime
prevention through environmental design’ and ‘defensible space’,
which have been utilised by built environment professionals and
law enforcement agencies since the 1970s.
Increasingly, these are also attributes that are entering current
discourse on countering terrorism in urban areas, although such
attempts to reduce terrorist risk are by no means unprecedented.
During the 1990s, the experience of UK authorities in attempting
to ‘design out’ terrorism was largely confined to efforts to stop car
bombing (or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIEDs)) by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
against the economic infrastructure in London. More recently,
concerns about the likelihood and impact of terrorist attack on
crowded public places using a variety of novel and experimental
deployment methods (e.g. the failed attacks in central London
and a partially successful VBIED at Glasgow airport in 2007) has
heightened the sense of fear in many urban locations as future
attacks against ‘soft targets’ appear more likely. Such forms of
terrorist attack also have echoes of a spate of PIRA bombings in
the mid-1970s against soft targets such as pubs and restaurants.
In short, over the last five years, the threat of terrorism has
evolved rapidly; new approaches to countering terrorism are
needed in response. Terrorism is understood here to mean one
of many operational methods deployed either singularly or as
part of a campaign so as to affect one or more targets, thereby
affecting political, social and economic life.3
Crowded public places (e.g. shopping areas, transport systems,
sports and conference arenas) in particular are at high risk.
Furthermore, they cannot be subject to traditional security
approaches such as searches and checkpoints without radically
changing public experience. The creation of an environment
that is inherently more resilient and less likely to suffer attack
through ‘designing in’ counter-terrorism to physical and
managerial urban systems, offers hope of improving security
in an acceptable as well as effective way.
Within this context, this paper sets out the challenges for
municipal engineers, built environment professionals and security
agencies to increase the terror resistance of our cities through
physical intervention and managerial measures—the hardware and
software of ‘resilient planning’.4 The approaches described form
the basis of ongoing research by the authors (Fig. 1).
2. WHY RESILIENT DESIGN FOR PUBLIC PLACES?
Before the events of 9/11, threats of terrorism predominantly
came from VBIEDs targeting major financial or political
centres. In response, attempts to counter terrorism often utilised
planning regulations and advanced technology to create
‘security zones’ or ‘rings of steel’ where access was restricted and
surveillance significantly enhanced.5 9/11 made such counter-
terrorist tactics appear inadequate, and security policy began to
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shift to proactive and pre-emptive solutions based on ideas of
resilience—defined here as ‘the ability to detect, prevent and if
necessary handle disruptive challenges.This includes but is not
limited to disruptive challenges arising from the possibility of a
terrorist attack’.6 This has forced a rethinking of traditional
emergency planning and counter-terrorist tactics given the
increased magnitude of the threats faced—especially those from
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) sources
which many terrorist groups have expressed significant interest
in utilising in attacks, and which, in the words of the UK prime
minister, could hit ‘anywhere and from any place’.7 Equally,
however, the threat posed by person-borne explosive devices in
crowded public places (e.g. the Bali pub bombings in 2002 and
the Madrid train attacks in 2004) is setting new challenges for
professionals involved in providing security in crowded places,
especially in light of the suicide attacks on the London transport
network in July 2005 and the London and Glasgow attacks in
July 2007.
Although debates on the relationship between new and
traditional threats continue, the methods and tactics adopted by
terror groups are novel, innovative and increasingly focused on
mass casualty strikes or multiple coordinated attacks. Such
attacks, often conducted by suicide attackers and tactically aimed
at ‘soft’ targets and more generally crowded places, have led to
considerable ongoing and multi-disciplinary research.8 Crowded
areas have features in common (such as their lack of access
control), but may be bounded (e.g. a stadium or train) or
unbounded (e.g. a shopping area). Some policy-related work has
helped to understand the changing nature of the threat in relation
to evolving groups such as Al Qaeda.9 Nevertheless, much of the
academic work post-9/11 fails to offer the truly multi-
disciplinary and inter-professional approach needed to develop
strategies to maintain community safety by deterring terrorism in
public places while ensuring public acceptability of the security
measures.
While iconic buildings and specific hubs such as airports have
long been identified as targets for terror attacks, a more general
reading of public places is also required if resilience is to be
enhanced. For example, public places such as shopping centres,
pubs, clubs and markets may be especially crowded at specific
times of the day or year. Depending on their social and cultural
function, public places may be fixed, but they may also be
Attribute Descriptor
Access and movement Places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement
without compromising security
Structure Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict
Surveillance Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked
Ownership Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community
Physical protection Places that include necessary, well-designed security features
Activity Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of
crime and a sense of safety at all times
Management and maintenance Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the
present and the future
Table 1. Attributes of sustainability relevant to crime prevention and community safety
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Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the RE-design project. This project is developing decision support strategies for implementing
counter-terrorism design of light rail systems and urban shopping areas, both of which fall within the definition of ‘crowded places’
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cordoned-off due to events and subject to impromptu queuing
and crowding. Although public places such as shopping malls or
train stations serve a community, they may be simultaneously
linked to the private sector, and accordingly, they could be
crowded at peak shopping or travel times. Together, this blend of
changing terror methods and targets, especially those directed at
crowded places in urban centres, provides a challenge for
security professionals and practitioners.
National policy makers and the security services now perceive
attacks against crowded public places as one of their key priorities
in the ongoing fight against terrorism. Since early 2003, the UK has
had a long-term strategy for developing resilience for counter-
terrorism (known within the government as Contest). Its aim is to
reduce the risk of terrorism in order that people can go about their
daily lives freely and with confidence. This resilience strategy is
divided into four strands: prevent, pursue, protect and prepare.10 In
this context, counter-terrorism design within the urban
environment can both reduce the likelihood of a place being
attacked and assist in the response stages if an attack occurs
(Fig. 2).
The protect strands of Contest are of key concern for issues of
community safety. For example, the Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure (CPNI) argues that
‘the Protect strand is concerned with reducing the vulnerability of the
UK and UK interests overseas to a terrorist attack. (and that) this
covers a range of issues including:
protecting key utilities by working with the private sector;
strengthening border security, so that terrorists and those who inspire
them can be prevented from travelling here and we can get better
intelligence about suspects who travel, including improving our
identity management;
reducing the risk and impact of attacks on the transport system
through security and technological advances;
protecting people going about their daily lives in crowded places’.11
Likewise, the prepare strand on Contest is of vital concern in
enhancing what might be termed ‘bouncebackability’ from
terrorism.4 A useful way to understand how risk can be reduced is
to consider risk as the product of vulnerability (how susceptible a
place or system is to attack), threat (how likely is the occurrence
of an attack, how motivated people are to attack) and criticality
(how serious the consequences are).12 This helps break down the
somewhat overwhelming aim of reducing the risk of a terrorist
attack by showing that risk can be reduced if any one of these
factors can be minimised. In many urban settings such as
shopping areas or light rail rapid-transit systems it may be
difficult to reduce vulnerability (because the areas are open to the
public and searching those entering is not a viable or acceptable
option) or threat (largely outside the influence of a municipal
engineer or transport operator). However, addressing the
consequences of an attack to enable the system or space to
‘bounceback’ into normal operation is more readily achievable.
Effectively, if the consequences of an attack are few, conducting
the attack may become less attractive, and the risk could thereby
be reduced.
3. RECENT THREATS TO PUBLIC PLACES IN THE UK
Recent evidence in the UK highlights that the threat posed by
terrorists targeting public places is real. For instance, the
unsuccessful coordinated improvised car bomb attacks in central
London in June 2007 demonstrated the need to defend crowded
public places. In this case, a car bomb was planted in central
London outside the popular nightclub Tiger Tiger. The car,
packed with 60 l of petrol, gas cylinders and nails, was parked
near Piccadilly Circus. Earlier the same night, a device only
170 m away had been removed and impounded by traffic
wardens from a nearby street. Both bombs were poorly
constructed and fortunately failed to explode. This failed attack
and the improvised attack the following day when a blazing car
was driven into Glasgow airport’s terminal building led to a
reassessment by government counter-terrorism security advisors
of other public venues with a view to providing additional
protection. As UK prime minister Gordon Brown noted in a
‘statement on security’ (25 July 2007):
The protection and resilience of our major infrastructure and crowded
places requires continuous vigilance. I can confirm that over 900
shopping centres, sports stadiums and venues where people
congregate have been assessed by counter-terrorism security advisers
and over 10 000 premises given updated security advice.13
Concern is also being expressed about management of the
security threat, in particular security procedures and queuing at
airports14 and other events at which rigorous security checks are
in force. These queues may themselves become targets since
they are outside secure areas and could be easily attacked.
Enhancing community safety in crowded places has been
backed up by large and ongoing streams of work being
conducted by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office
(Nactso) on disseminating protective security advice to places
deemed vulnerable to targeting (e.g. shopping centres, bars,
pubs, clubs and sports stadia.)15 This concern for the protection
of crowded places was further reinforced in Lord West’s report
(published in November 2007 following the London and
Glasgow attacks), which called for counter-terrorism measures
to be embedded within the design, planning and construction of
public places.16
Traditionally considered separately from the crowded spaces for
which Nactso has primary responsibility, transport systems are
hugely important in the vitality of urban life and the economic
success of urban areas. Light rail systems interface most closely
with city centre environments, either through on-street running
or underground stations opening onto city streets. The lead on
the security of such systems is being taken by the Department
Prevent terrorism
by tackling
underlying causes
Protect UK and
public interests 
Prepare for the
consequences 
Pursue terrorists
or those who
support them
Reduce
vulnerability
Reduce risk
Reduce the threat
Fig. 2. Representation of the UK government’s Contest
strategy10
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for Transport’s (DfT) Transport Security and Contingencies
Directorate (Transec) and by the British Transport Police. Since
there are many fewer underground and light rail facilities than
other urban crowded places such as shops and bars, security
advice can be far more specific. There is a regulatory security
regime in place for London Underground, Docklands Light
Railway and Glasgow Subway, with the DfT acting as inspector
and regulator and day-to-day delivery of security resting with
the system operators in partnership with British Transport
Police. Other light rail operators are subject to an advisory best
practice security programme,17 although legislation exists that
can move this to a regulatory footing if the need arises. Despite
the different regulatory approaches, the new threats faced by
these systems are similar to those faced by other crowded places,
and their normal operation precludes security approaches such
as airport-style perimeter searches.
4. BEYOND ENGINEERED DEFENCE
To achieve the creation or construction of a resilient environment
and to reduce the risk of a wide and unpredictable variety of
terrorist threats requires an adaptable and holistic security effort
that encompasses both ‘hard’ engineering and design solutions,
and ‘soft’ governance and management arrangements. As
Richard Little18 noted
Threats are unpredictable and the full range of threats probably
unknowable.Security in this situation needs to be flexible and agile
and capable of addressing new threats as they emerge. Protective
technologies have a key role to play in making our cities safer but
only if supported by organizations and people who can develop pre-
attack security strategies, manage the response to an attack, and
hasten recovery from it.
Although there is much talk of new threats and changing terrorist
tactics, we should also be aware that traditional methods of urban
terrorism using VBIEDs are still likely to be more prevalent than
CBRN or suicide attack. In this situation we should therefore seek
to reinforce traditional counter-terrorism measures as well as
planning for ‘new’ threat realities.
In response to new and evolving threats, new counter-measures
have been required that often focus on worst-case recovery
scenarios; this represents a shift in emphasis from previous
reactive emergency planning philosophies. Such alterations in
traditional strategies have led not only to the enhancement and
reconceptualisation of approaches to counter-terrorism, but also
to the requirement for a more robust decision support framework
by which security processes can be effectively applied and
managed in relation to the built environment.19
One security approach is to attempt to ‘design out’ or mitigate the
effects of terrorism by creating an environment that is inherently
less likely to suffer attack or can minimise consequences and
impact—one in which primary security resources such as the
police can operate without hindrance by building layout or one
in which public participation in counter-terrorism through
general vigilance is enhanced. Similar approaches have been
used successfully to design out crime in residential
environments20 and transport infrastructure.21 A considerable
body of work already exists on environmental design for crime
prevention where a sense of community safety can be fostered by
enhancing defensible space, natural surveillance and community
interaction.22 In some cases this could crossover to provide
counter-terrorism strategies.
From an engineering design perspective, the use of ‘hardened’ or
enhanced-performance materials (e.g. those offering blast or
fragmentation resistance) has been increasing. Such proactive
strategies emerged in the 1990s in London as a response to PIRA
attacks against the City of London and London Docklands, but
have been increasingly mainstreamed across the country and
utilised by the police and built environment professionals; Davey
et al., for example, highlight the greater use made of blast-
resistant materials and structures in building design.23 The
adoption of such solutions in some areas of the UK now plays a
part in successful planning approval for new projects. From an
urban design perspective, the construction of spaces that allow
for clear sightlines for CCTV, greater ‘standoff’ distances around
buildings or controlled access in certain areas has been
encouraged. For example, following the 1996 bomb in central
Manchester, damaged areas of the city centre were reconstructed
with community safety in mind through restricted vehicle access
to central shopping zones, a centralised CCTV system, secure
‘standoff’ areas for high-profile (and hence high target risk)
buildings and bomb-proof litter bins (Fig. 3).
Urban transport systems commonly adopt many of the same
measures in their design and operation of stations, with most
measures focused on preventing concealment of an explosive
device. For example, ticketing and vending machines can be
positioned to avoid gaps in which a device could be hidden.
Bicycle racks and left luggage lockers present particular
difficulties, and in many cases have been simply removed or
positioned some distance from the main station facilities.
However, these actions can do little to defend against a person-
borne explosive device; design solutions such as blast-resistant
glazing may offer the hope of minimum damage and quick
recovery in the worst case. High-technology sensors for early
detection of explosive or chemical agents may also have a role,24
although mass scanning of high volumes of people remains
technologically challenging.
With many new security measures being introduced in a variety
of crowded public places, there are pitfalls and difficulties in the
adoption of approaches originally developed for non-terror
Fig. 3. The standoff area surrounding the Hilton Hotel in central
Manchester
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situations (crime reduction and deterrence) for counter-terrorism.
For example, a terrorist and a criminal may have different
psychological relationships to the risk of being caught, which
will affect the success of counter measures. In addition, crime
almost always has measurable social and financial costs, whereas
there is currently no economic measure for the threat of
terrorism. Terrorist threats are not easily quantified, so it is
difficult to determine the ‘right’ level of security, especially for
organisations that are too small to justify dedicated security
professionals.
An additional factor is the reverse process whereby counter-
terrorism strategies and technologies may be re-appropriated
for crime-reduction purposes.25 For example, sniffer dogs
introduced to detect a terrorist threat or the installation of
advanced CCTV may in reality be used for crime deterrence.
While this may be a valuable additional role, the change in
public perception of the counter-terrorism measures could lead
to a weakening in the resilience of a place or system when
threatened or attacked.26 A parallel issue, which raises public
acceptability questions, is ‘function creep’ in the use of
personal data from smart card ticketing systems such as
London’s Oyster card.27 Data originally used for transport
planning are increasingly being accessed during police
inquiries,28 although there is no bulk access to data by police,
public sector or commercial organisations.29
Spatial design, material choices, aesthetics and many other
‘design’ factors can influence a location’s vulnerability to attack.
It is not suggested that design is a primary defence against a
terror attack, but it does form one part of a multi-layered and
multi-pronged system of security. Current research has identified
that key stakeholders recognise that resilient design will become
central to planning, construction guidelines and legislation in the
near future.30 An important aspect of counter-terrorism design is
that it can provide benefits at very low cost if it is implemented at
the planning stage of a shopping area, rail system or venue,31
whereas costs can be much higher in a retro-fit situation.32 For
example, this message was reinforced by Lord West’s counter-
terrorism report, which emphasised how proactive engineering
and management solutions to mitigate the impact of terrorism
should be incorporated into pre-planning and design stages of
new developments.
5. BALANCING EFFECTIVENESS AND
ACCEPTABILITY IN COUNTER-TERRORISM
MANAGEMENT
As highlighted earlier in this paper, the hard engineering
component of resilient planning is only part of the counter-
terrorism scenario. Equally important is the governance solution
developed to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are informed
and consulted about the development of counter-terrorism
measures and strategies. In short, the search for inter-
professional solutions in resilient planning aims to facilitate a
joined-up approach to development among the police,
emergency planners, spatial planners and other built
environment professionals through incorporating risk
management into urban decision-making.30 Similar reforms
have taken place in transport operations, with an increasingly
regulatory approach for both national ‘heavy’ rail and urban
light rail or metro systems, and the publication of a
recommended best practice guide for bus and coach security.33
Development of this multi-level and inter-professional
managerial nexus for resilience is still ongoing and has tended to
be more concerned with developing statutory obligations than in
broadening the inclusively of decision making. This is evident in
both design decision making and in attempts to develop greater
levels of community safety, alongside an appreciation of the
potential social impacts of such measures.
5.1. Integrated thinking on resilience
There is no structured integration of views regarding resilient
planning and design in contemporary cities among built
environment professionals.19 Generally, issues of resilience in
relation to security have tended to take a restricted and
technocratic approach, applicable to only a narrow cohort of
‘experts’ most notably the police.4 Today there is undoubtedly
a shift towards more integrated approaches to managing risk,
one that requires more inclusive conversations with different
stakeholders to develop a sense of collective responsibility.
This is particularly the case with so much of city centres
privately owned or managed, for example by shopping centres,
and supported by independently run transport services. What is
now required is security professionals to be involved in
construction and planning from the outset, ‘mitigating these
risks at the core of the buildings design, rather than being an
afterthought’.34
The management of crowded places has also been subject to
appraisal in order to assess how it might assist the counter-
terrorist effort. For the business community and public sector
professionals across the UK, training schemes (which have
emerged from London’s experience of dealing with terrorism) are
now being developed to help them plan for a possible attack and
integrate their thinking in order to effectively deal with both
traditional and ‘new’ forms of terrorist attack. These schemes
have been rolled out across the UK in order to heighten
community safety and the speed of response to potential terrorist
attack as well as aid business continuity.
Such initiatives include project Griffin and project Argus. In 2004,
the City of London Police and the Metropolitan Police launched
project Griffin as a joint partnership with the private sector security
industry. The underlying principles of Griffin were concerned with
trying to disrupt hostile reconnaissance (i.e. would-be terrorists
visiting potential attack sites in advance), aiming to provide cordon
support and/or high-visibility patrols, and supporting police
services during critical incidents. For example, on 7 July 2005
in the central financial zones of London, numerous Griffin-
trained private security guards assisted the police. At the time of
writing, project Griffin has been implemented in a further 18 cities
in the UK to raise awareness of counter-terrorism and law
enforcement issues in order to better equip security personnel to
deal with their organisation’s security challenges on a day-to-day
basis and in the event of a major incident.
Project Argus, a Nactso initiative started in 2007, has been
influential across the UK in aiding business continuity; it
explores ways to aid businesses in preventing, handling and
recovering from a terrorist attack, particularly against crowded
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public places. To date over 200 Argus workshops have been held
in towns and cities across the UK, providing an opportunity for
local business to reflect upon their existing security and
contingency plans, and take part in exercises that simulate a
terrorist attack similar to the London bombings of July 2005. The
aim of Argus is to build participants’ capacity to react in the
event of an attack.
5.2. The acceptability of resilient design
Current approaches to urban ‘place-making’ are now expected to
take account of the multiple voices of stakeholders and local
community—a long-standing difficulty for built environment
professionals.35 Importantly, key issues related to the social impact
of counter-terrorism strategies and community engagement have
been largely absent from official discussions on resilience and
counter-terrorism. It is argued that this is a key omission—for
counter-terrorist resilient design to be successful itmust not only be
effective (incorporating the design and managerial solutions
previously mentioned) but must also be acceptable to the owners,
inhabitants and users of particular places. Furthermore, this
acceptability encompasses complex financial, social and aesthetic
considerations.
Recent scholarship in humanities, urban studies and
architecture has highlighted the risks that counter-terrorism
measures pose for the functional integrity of urban space in
terms of their potential to contribute to an atmosphere of
fear,36 a culture of surveillance, consequences for social
control and freedom of movement,37 and a reduction in
democratic involvement in urban planning and construction38
often leading to the increasing militarisation of urban
design.39 There is also a particular risk that counter-terrorism
measures may alienate specific members of the community
who feel singled out as potential threats and, in extreme cases,
could turn to more radical beliefs.
There is clearly a need to address the problem of terrorism while
remaining attuned to social concerns through the integration of
social factors. Such concerns are often difficult to quantify
within the overly technocratic counter-terrorism design
solutions that are commonplace in the engineering sciences.
More practically, decision-makers must consider which
strategies best support the maintenance of public vigilance—and
which create unnecessary fear.
6. THE EMERGING RESEARCH AGENDA:
ENHANCING COMMUNITY SAFETYAND COUNTER-
TERRORISM IN URBAN RENAISSANCE
There is widespread concern for community safety amidst
apprehension about terrorist attacks on crowded public places—
in particular, security considerations for urban outdoor shopping
areas and the more highly bounded, but still open access, light
rail systems that support the busiest of city centres.
In pedestrian spaces, elements such as public squares, shopping
promenades, outdoor cafe´s and restaurants are increasingly
emphasised in urban planning and architectural design, and are
important ingredients in contemporary urban renaissance. By
design, they are open, flexible and rapidly evolving. They are a
hybrid of commercial and public space that has been quick to
incorporate developments in media-based architecture (media
screens, light installations, information terminals, etc.), thereby
offering the potential for new forms of public participation and
interaction in the city and the possibility of an increasingly
responsive built environment.40
Likewise, light rail systems are an essential component in
many cities (particularly those undergoing regeneration) and
offer hope of overcoming traffic congestion crises faced by
many city centres. These systems are designed to be easy to
access and high passenger flows demand a minimum of delays,
making many conventional security approaches (such as those
employed at airports) unfeasible.41 Both these types of
‘crowded places’ have great potential to benefit from design
changes offering deterrence or protection from terrorism, but
their essential role in modern cities means that security cannot
be allowed to detract from their primary function. In other
words, whatever design, engineering or management changes
are implemented, they must be seen as proportional to the
ongoing threat of terrorism. It is possible that aiming to reduce
the consequences should an attack occur, rather than focusing
solely on prevention, may achieve this. There will also be the
inevitable need to incorporate retro-fit design solutions,
especially as modes of terrorism change.
What is also constantly alluded to in the academic and
policy literature is the need to balance higher levels of
security with concerns for the functionality of places. As
resilient planning and design continues to evolve, increasingly
inter-professional solutions and an interdisciplinary
perspective for evaluating counter-terrorist design (including
social impact, physical feasibility and likely effectiveness of
the designs) are required.
From a construction sector perspective, Bosher et al.42 argue that
there are a number of key actions required to address systems in
the built environment that are at risk from natural hazards (such
as floods) and human-induced hazards (such as terrorist attacks).
These actions are categorised as broadly relating to
(a) innovation and knowledge—transdisciplinary training and
hazard awareness
(b) operations—information exchanges between a wide range of
stakeholders such as planners, designers, engineers and the
emergency and security services
(c) planning—well-designed and suitable locations
(d ) legislation and regulatory incentives—building codes and
good practice guidance.
Bosher et al. further establish the need for a framework to help
construction and non-construction stakeholders to address
hazards during the earliest planning and design stages.19
This, it is argued, can be achieved through the creation of
decision support tools such as those that will be developed in
the project outlined in Fig. 1. It is hoped that such tools will
improve relationships between those who design and engineer
public spaces, those that manage and secure them, and those
that use them.
Counter-terrorism strategies and resilience in the UK will be
increasingly successful when more fully integrated into the
planning, design, construction, operation and management of
public places and their support systems (e.g. transport networks).
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This will, of course, require the adoption of locally contingent
solutions that are both effective and acceptable. Furthermore, any
solutions will require an analysis of the material specificities
(including symbolic and aesthetic implications) and management
processes involved in decisions on counter-terrorism, alongside
an assessment of the evolving threat profile and emerging tactics
of would-be terrorists.
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